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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CARL T. EVANS,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS.

PICKETT BROS FARMS, a

Case No. 12616

Partnership and JESS W. PICKETT,
Otherwise known as J. W. Pickett,
Defend ants and Appellants.
RE SPONDENT"S BRIEF
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

Plaintiff filed this suit to recover a principal balance
of $1065.00, plus interest on that amount from its due
date until the date of judgment at the rate of 6% per
annum, plus plaintiff's costs, claimed to be owed by
the defendants to the plaintiff. Plaintiff contends
that his claim is founded upon an instrument or instruments in writing, and at the trial Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,
2, and 3 were offered and received in evidence, one or
more of which, along with other proven facts, meets
the requirements of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A 1953, Utah's
six-year Statute of Limitations, as being founded upon
an instrument or instruments in writing. Defendants
contend that plaintiff's claim is barred by the provi1

sions of Section 78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953, the four-year Stat.
u.te of Limitations, and section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953, the
six-year Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff contends that
hi-s claim is not barred by the four-year Statute of Lim.
itations because such Statute is not applicable to plain·
tiff's claim, and that his claim is not barred by the six·
year Statute of Limitations for the reason that this Stat·
ute had not run when plaintiff's Complain was filed on
October 11, 1967.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The Lower Court, Hon. J. Harlan Burns, found and
held that plaintiff's claim is not barred by the four-year
Statute of Limitations pleaded, and that plaintiff's claim
is founded upon an instrument or instruments in writ·
ing, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and Plain·
tiff's Exhibit 3, thereby bringing the plaintiff's claim
within Utah's six-year Statute of Limitations, Section
78-12-23 U.C.A 1953, and that by virtue thereof and oth·
er facts found in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, including payments made by the defend·
ants to the plaintiff which started the Statute of Limi·
tations to running over again, and the period of time
that both partners of the partnership of Pickett Bros.
Farms were out of the State of Utah which tolled the
running of the Statute, and that the six-year period of
limitations had not run when plaintiff's Complaint was
filed, and that plaintiff's claim is not barred by the six·
year Statute of Limitations pleaded by the defe~da~tl,
and that the defendants owed the plaintiff a prmc1pal
balance of $1065.00, which amount the Court found had
been due and owing from the defendants to the plaint·
iff since September 22, 1961, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from September 22
1961, to the date of judgment, and for plaintiff's costs.
and entered judgment accordingly.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and appellants desire that the decision
of the luwer Court be reversed on the ground that plaintiff's claim is not founded upon an instrument or instruments in writing, but upon an oral agreement and
that plaintiff's claim is barred by the Statutes of Limitation pleaded by defendants. Plaintiff seeks to have
the decision of the lower Court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 18, 1959, the defendant, Jess
W. Pickett, contacted the plaintiff, Carl T. Evans, about
doing land leveling of 40 acres of land in Parowan Valley for Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership. The plaintiff told said defendant he could do such land leveling,
and when plaintiff was asked what his charges would
be plaintiff told Jess W. Pickett that $10.00 an hour is
what plaintiff charged for his equipment and for himself in such land leveling, and the defendant, Jess W.
Pickett, told the plaintiff that that was a satisfactory
price for such services. Transcript page 4,, lines 2 to 19,
Incl. The defendant Jess W. Pickett told the plaintiff
that he had applied to the Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service, ASC, for assistance in sharing a
part of the cost of such land leveling, and for the necessary engineering work that had to be done in connection with the project. Transcript page 4, lines 13 to 16,
Incl. and lines 22 to 24, Incl.
After the engineering for the project had been done
plaintiff was instructed by the defendant, J. W. Pickett,
to proceed with the work. Plaintiff proceeded with the
land leveling, using a crawler tractor weighing approximately 12 tons, and a carry-all weighing about 3 tons.
Transcript page 6, lines 7 to 13, Incl. As stated in Appellants' Brief, page 3, the land leveling was done in
October and November, 1959, and was completed No-
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vember 29, 1959. Plaintiff kept track of the hours he
spent using said equipment in doing this land leveling
and put in 246% hours on the project. Transcript page
7, lines 17 to 22, Incl.
After the land leveling had been completed and
Gordon C. Kirtley, Project Engineer, had approved the
work, and on December 11, 1959, the plaintiff went to
the ASC offices in Cedar City to help fill out papers relating to this land leveling transaction. It was there
that Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was filled out in triplicate
Those portions of the instrument that are typed in were
typed in by ASC secretary, and the plaintiff filled in,
in his handwriting, all parts of the instrument which
are in handwriting, except the signatures and the dates
accompanying each signature. Alma C. Lawrence sign·
ed the instrument for the government agency and wrote
the date of signing 12-11-59, to the right of his signa·
ture. The farmer, Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership,
was required to sign this document after it was filled
out, and as Jess W. Pickett had left Iron County and
gone to California the secretary at the ASC office ad·
dresed an envelope to Jess W. Pickett at his California
address, and the instrument so filled in was mailed to
Jess W. Pickett for his signature. Thereafter the instru·
ment duly signed in triplicate "Pickett Bros. Farms by
J. W. Pickett, Mgr." followed by the date 12-14-59 was
returned to the ASC office in Cedar City, and thereupon
the pink copy was sent to the farmer, Pickett Bros.
Farms, the blue one, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was furnisred
to the plaintiff, vendor, and the ASC retained the white
one.
The ASC paid the $1,000.00 it had agreed to pay on
the land leveling. Only two payments were made by the
defendants to the plaintiff, namely, one payment of $100.
00 evidenced by the Defendant's Exhibit 1 - check date~
April 25, 1960, and the other a payment of $300.00 evi·
denced by Defendants' Exhibit 2 - check dated Sep·
4

tember 3, 1961, for that amount. Jess W. Pickett did
mail to the plaintiff a check, Plaintiff's exhibit 2, Payable to plaintiff for $700.00, from California where he
then \Vas, which had written on the back of it "Payment in Full for land leveling in 1959." This check was
never cashed as plaintiff would not accept the amount
thereoff in full settlement, and plaintiff told defendant,
Jess W. Pickett, that there was an additional $365.00
over and above the amonnt of said check due plaintiff.
Transcript page 12, line 30, page 13, lines 1 to 30, Incl.
page 14, lines 1to17, Incl.
The defendant Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership,
<.:onsisting of Jess W. Pickett, otherwise known as J. W.
Pickett, and his brother, M. G. Pickett. Transcript page
39, lines 7 to 11, Incl. M. G. Pickett has resided in
California and has spent no substantial amount of
time in Utah since December, 1959. Transcr~pt page
39, lines 7 to 11, Incl., and lines 26 to 30, Incl. and page
40, line 1. The other partner Jess W. Pickett, otherwise
know as J. \V. Pickett, was out of the State of Utah and
in the State of California from January 2, 1962, to the
last of April, 1962. The check, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, dated Jan. 2, 1962, was mailed by said defendant to the
plaintiff from California and received by the plaintiff
on or about that date, and the said defendant did not
come back to Utah until the last part of April in 1962,
at which time the plaintiff first talked to said defendant, Jess \V. Pickett, about the check and told him in
substance that the check did not constitute full payment for the land leveling - that it lacked $365.00 of
being the amount that was due the plaintiff for the
land leveling. Transcript page 12, line 30, page 13, lines
l to 30, Incl., and page 14, lines 1 to 17. Incl. The plaintiff contacted the defendant, Jess W. Pickett, numerous
times requesting payment of the full balance due for
such land leveling, and finally said defendant told the
plaintiff he was not intending to pay it. Transcript page
14, lines 18 to 30, Incl,. and page 15, lines 1 to 30, Incl.,
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and page 16, lines 1 to 16, Incl. And plaintiff thereafter
and on October 11, 1967, filed this suit.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1: The plaintiff-respondent's claim is found.
ed upon an instrument or instruments in writing, and
hence Utah's six-year Statute of Limitations, Section
78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 applies.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Plaintiff"s Exhibit 2 wet€
signed Pickett Bros. Farms, by J. W. Pickett, Mgr. for
and in behalf of said partnership, consisting of himsell
and his brother M. G. Pickett. These exhibits constitutr
admissions and statements of facts by the defendants ol
the essential facts relating to the land leveling transac·
tion between the plaintiff-respondent and the defend·
ants-appellants, from which the law will imply a,1 ob·
ligation on the part of the obligors to pay, and hence
bring the case within the six-year Statute, 78-12-23 U.CA
1953.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Section 11, designatrs what
was furnished to the Farmer, Picket Bros. Farms, Land
Leveling of 40 acres of land at a price of $10.00 per
hour, for a total maximum cost of $2465.00, with a max·
imum payment by the government of $1,000.00, and this
Exhibit further provides "SC'ction 111 the materials or
services described in Section 11, columnc; (a) and (cl
were received by me and will be or have been used in
carrying out the approved practices under the Agr!<:ul·
tural Conservation Program for which they were fur·
nished. I certify that the price paid to the vendor does
not exceed the difference between the fair price, if ap·
plicable, and the payment by the Government."
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, the Land Leveling Plan pre·
pared by Gordon C. Kirtley, Engineer for Soil Conserva·
tion Service, and which was signed and approved b)
Pkkett Bros. Farms, by J. W. Pickett, Mgr., while prob·
6

ably not by itself constituting a complete instrument·in
writing upon which the action could be founded, does
set forth more in detail the land leveling which the
plaintiff was to do and did do for the defendants, and
constitutes a written approval by the defendants of the
contents of said instrument, and if more details pertaining to the land leveling to be done and which was
done by the plaintiff for the defendants are required
than were set forth and agreed to by the defendants in
plaintiff's Exhibit 1, this Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 suppli~s
them.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, the check for $700.00 written
to the plaintiff and signed by Pickett Bros. Farms, by
J. W. Pickett, dated January 2, 1962, and mailed by the
defendant J. W. Pickett to the plaintiff on or about the
day it bears date, constitutes a written acknowledgment
that the defendants owed the plaintiff at least the amount
of this check for the land leveling done by the plaintiff
for the defendants
The following authorities are submitted in support
of plaintiff's contention that plaintiff's action is founded upon an instrument or instruments in writing with.:
in subdivision (2) of Section 78-12-23, U.C.A. 1953, the
six year statute:
Statutory provision: 78-12-23 U.C.A 1953. Within si?C
years - (2) An action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except
those mentioned in the preceding section.
BRACKLEIN v. REALTY INS. CO. at al, - 80 P. (2nd)
471, 95 Utah 490.
11. The statutes of limitations on liabilitf.es "founded upon an instrument in writing" and "not found¢
upon an instrument in writing" means the same as though
the word "founded" were omitted, and action is "founded upon an instrument in writing" if liability grows out
?f written instruments, not remotely or ultimately, but
immediately; if it arises or is assumed or imposed from
from the instrument itself, or its recitals; if the instrument aC'knowledges or states a fact from which law im7.

plies
obligation to pay or . contains the contract 0 r pro.
.
m1se to pay or to do the thmg for which action is brought
Rev. St. 1933, 104-2-22; 104-2-23, as amended by law~
1935, c. 113.

13 ..A. caus~ of action for foreclosure of mortgage
and ~ef1c1ency Judgment against grantee of mortgagea
premises who assumed the mortgage by class in the deed
was "found~d .on ~nstruments in writing" within six-year
statute of hm1tat10ns, though grantee did not sign note
mortgage or deed. Rev. St. 1933, 104-2-22, 104-2-23, a;
amended by Laws 1935, c. 113.
14. A Grantee's acceptance of a deed containinz
mortgage assumption clause makes the obligations creat'.
ed by deed a written contract, not subject to limitatiom
governing oral contracts. Rev. St. 1933, 104-2-22; 104·2·
23 as amended by Laws 1935, c. 113.

O'BRIEN v. KING, 164 Pac., 631, 174 Cal. 769.
1. A cause of action is "founded on an instrument in
writing," within Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 337, subd. 1, limit·
ing such actions to four years, when the contract, obliga·
tion, or liabilility grows out of written instruments, nol
remotely, but immediately.
2. An instrument reading "Received from (plaintiff)
• • • $450 in U. S. gold coin, at 5 per cent interest" sign·
ed by defendant, is an instrument in writing, barred only
after four years, under Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 337, subd. l.
TAGUS RANCH CO. v. HUGHES, 148 P. '..:::d, 79, 64 CA.
128.
1. A cause of action is "founded on an instrument
in writing," within statute limiting such actions to four
years, where the contract, obligation or liabilit~ grows
out of written instruments, not remotely or uJt1mately.
but immediately. Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 337, subd. 1.
2. In order to come within statute limiting act!o~s
founded on instruments in \\Ti ting to four years,~
sufficient if writing upon which action is based acknow·
ledges the debt and sets forfli--asfafo- of facts frorr1~
obligation of Iiability-to--E~Y-~~~c~ssarH_i~an~-~
flows, and writing need not conta_i_n ~n exIJress pr~
to pay. Code Civ. Proc-:-sec. 337, subd. 1. (underJming
ours).
8

3. An instrument reading "I, • • • hereby confess
and acknowledge that I have stolen and embezzled from
you the sum of Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Three and
801100 ($1963.80) ", signed by defendant, was an "instrument in writing" so that cause of action thereon
was barred only after four years. Code Civ. Proc. Sec.
337, subd. l.
TANZOLA v. DE RITA, 277 P. 2d, 515, California, 1955.
6. Loans in form of two checks, with word "loan"
written thereon constituted agreement evidenced by
writing, so that four-year, not two-year, statute of limitations applied to action against executor of husband's
will on such checks after his death. Code Civ. Proc. Secs.
337, 339.
t. To come within four-year statute of limitations
applicable to action for debt evidenced by or founded on
written contract, writing need not contain express promise to pay debt, but is sufficient, if it acknowledges debt
and states facts from which obligation or liability to pay
debt necessarily and directly flows. Code Civ .. Proc. Sec.
337. (underlining ours.)

The fact that oral negotiations took place and an
oral agreement was reached, concerning which in our
case there was some dispute, does not preclude the claim
from being founded upon an instrument or instruments
in writing if later a writing were signed by the party to
be charged thereby, in which he agrees to facts from
which the law will imply an obligation to pay the amount
designated.
See the case of JOSEPH TANZOLA v. JOHN DE RITA,
EXECUTOR, 285 P. 2d, 897, 88 Cal. 2d 1.
3. Action against executor for recovery of money allegedly loaned to testator by plaintiff, evidenced by two
checks with the word "loan" written upon their faces
and endorsed by testator's wife, who had full authority
to make such endorsement on his behalf, was not an ac
tion founded on an oral agreement and was governed ~y
four-year limitations' statute. West's Ann. Code Civ.
Proc. Secs. 337, 339, subd. 1.
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Language of the court, page 901. .._ ___ _ _
The facts that plaintiff in his original comp-1-~i;~t- ~li .
ed that he and decedent "entered into an oral agr~
ment whereby " plaintiff agreed to loan $12,000 to d~
c.edent .and that pursuant to such oral agreement plain·
tiff debvered the two S6,000.00 checks to decedent d
not establish this action as one upon an oral rather
written obligation ..... "
n
The following cases cited by opposing counsel in
appelants' brief as authority for holding plaintiff's clairr,
is not founded upon an instrument in writing, are not
in point in this case for the following reasons:
The case of Whitehall -vs- Lowe, 37 P. 589, 10 Uta~
419, simply held that the two verbal agreements upon
which the plaintiff based his ciairi.1 were so vague ana
uncertain that neither could be enforced. No contention
was made that either of the claims sued upon were
founded upon an instrument in writing.

t;:'

In the case of Woolf -vs- Grny - 158 P. 788, 48 Utan

239, the plaintiff's Complaint set forth two causes of ac·

tion, the first on an open account and the second on an
account stated. The court held that both claims were
barred by the respective Statutes of Limitation appfo
able to each. No contention was made that either claim
was founded upon an instrument in writing.

In the case of O'Donnell -vs- Parker - 160 P. 1192

48 Utah 578, the question was not whether the plaintiffs

claim was based on an open account or was founded upon
an instrument in writing, but the question to be decid~
was whether the defendant by scheduling the account
sued upon in his petition in bankniptcy <1.f1er it was out·
lawed, constituted a written ackno\vledgment of the.ex·
istence of the debt undc1· a stalc1te of the same wording
as our present Section 78-1:2-44 U.C.A. 1953. The court
held that it was not.
As stated by opposing counsc 1 the six-year statu~e
•
r J
Fuel & Grain
was not involved m the case 01 cremy
7P
Company -vs- Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co. · 20 ·
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155; 60 Utah 153.
In the case of Last Chance Ranch Co. -vs- Erickson -

25 P. 2d 952; 82 Utah 475, plaintiff's claim was based solely upon an oral agreement to transfer stock and the same

oral agreement rieterated one year and three months
later. The court held that the four-year statute started
to run on the first date the plaintiff could have sued on
the first oral agreement, and as four years had run from
that date before the commencement of the action the
claim was barred.
In the case of Petty and Riddle, Inc., -vs- Lunt - 138
P. 2d 648; 104 Utah 130, the plaintiff Petty and Riddle
Inc., a corporation, sued Wilson N. Lunt, an exstockholder for one-half of the moneys the corporation had
to pay the State of Utah and to the United States Government after the assets of the corporation had been
divided between Charles B. Petty and Wilson N. Lunt,
the two principal stoskholders of the corporation, pursuant to a written agreement between them idividually.
The plaintiff corporation contended that its claims were
based on the written agreement between the said two
principal stockholders , and that the lim~tation for
bringing the action was controlled by the six-year statute. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing
in the written agreement between the two stockholders
that gave the plaintiff corporation any claim for the relief prayed for, and that the claims of the plaintiff corporation, if any existed, were founded upon implied contract, and that action on such claims was barred for the
reason that the four-year statute had run before the action was filed.
POINT 2: The six-year Statute of Limitations had
not run when this action was commenced.
Part payments on this contractual obligation were
made by the defendants to the plaintiff as follows:
$100.00 on April 25, 1960, and $300.00 on September 3,
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1961, and these payments started the six-year Stat
f L" .
·
u~
o
im1tat1~ns running over again on the respectiw
dates on which they were made. In support of this con.
tention the plaintiff submits the following:
78-12-44 U.C.A. 1953.
"78-12-44. Payment -- Acknowledgment -- PromL11
to pay extends period. In any case founded on contract
when any part of the principal or interest shall haw
been paid, or an ackno\vledgment of an exisling liabilih
debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall ha~f
been made, an action may be brnugi1t within the perion
prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledi·
ment or promise; but such acknowlegment or promlle
must be in writing, signed by foe party to be chargea
thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provi·
sions of any statute, it sllall be unavailable either asa
cause of action or ground of defense." (underlinig ours.I
CROMPTON v. JENSON et al., I P. 2d. 242, 78 Utah 55
2. Payments on mortgage by mortgagor's authorizei
agent, who subsequently pu1·chased property, preclud~
mortgagor or purchaser from claiming mortgage wai
barred by limitations (Comp. Laws 1917, Secs. 6445,
6466).
BAKER v. BROUGHTON et al., 146 P. 2d, 832, 193 Okl
656.
5. A payment of interest on mortgage debt by mort·
gagor after his conveyance of mortgaged realty to an·
other, but before bar of statute of limitations has~~
come complete, tolls statute as against grai:tee takmi
with notice of, but not assuming and agreeing to pay,
mortgage.
BROWN v. DECK, 152 P. 2cl. 587, 65 Idaho 710.
1. Where two payments were made on note secure-0
by mortgage, last of which was made before statute. 01
limitations had run against the de~t, t~e cause of act1o~
was not barred by statute of lm11tat10ns regardl~ss 0
whether the payments ,,·ere made on principal or mter·
est. Code 1932, Sec. 5-238.
MERCER v. MERCER, 180 P. '.2d, 248, 120 Mt. 132. . e
1. A payment of principal and intf'rest extends t;m 1
for commencement of action on note from date of as
12

payment. Rev. Codes 1935, Secs. 9029, 9062.
The proofs showed that both defendants were outside of the State of Utah from January 2, 1962, to the
last of April, 1962. See last paragraph of Statement of
Facts. The court found, paragrah 9 of Findings of Facts
that both defendants were out of the State of Utah from
January 2, 1962, to April 1, 1962. While this period was
less than the proofs showed, this period tolled the running of the six-year statute of limitations on plaintiff's
claim long enough to make plaintiff's action filed within
the six-year limitation period.
For authorities in support of the rule that absence
from the state after a cause of action accrues tolls the
running of the statute of limitations during such period, plaintiff submits the following:
78-12-35 U.C.A. 1953
Effect of absence from state. -- If when a cause of
action accrues against a person when he is out of the
state, the action may be commenced within the term
herein limited after his return to the state; and if after
a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action. (underlining ours.)

KEITH-O'BRIEN v. SNYDER, 169 Pac., 954, 51 Utah 227,
1. 954 Compiled Laws 1907, Section 2888, pm-vidtng that if, when the cause of action accrues against
a gerson, he is out of the state, the action may be
commenced within the term limited after his return
to the state, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he
departs from the state, the time of his absence is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action, applies though the debtor has a place of abode
or residence within the state so that process might have
been served not withstanding his absence .
. 3. Under Comp. Laws 1907, Sec. 288.8, the stat~te of
lm1tations runs only while the debtor is openly m ~e
state, and immediately on his leaving it, the s~atute ag~m
ceases to run until his return, and in computmg the time
of absence all the periods of absence must be consdered
and added together.
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BUELL v. DUCHESNE MERCANTILE CO., 231 Pac. 123
64 Utah 391.
2. Debtor's absence from state tolls the statute of
limitations (Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 6465), notwithstand.
ing he maintains residence in state \Vith persons residing
there upon whom service of process might be made.

1

SEELY v. COWLEY, 365 P. 2d, 63,12 Utah 2d 252.
3. Statute to effect that if, after cause of action ac.
crues against person he departs from state, time of his
absence is not part of time limited for commencement
of action, applies to personal representative of estate who
absents himself from state. U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-28(2), 78·
12-35.
Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations started
running over again on September 3, 1961, and it run from
that date until January 2, 1962, a period of four months;
then the running of the statute was tolled from January
2, 1962, to April 1, 1962, and it began running again and
run from April 1, 1962, to October 11, 1967, a period of
five years six-months and eleven days. The total of said
two periods during which the six-year statute run to
the date on which this action was filed on October 11,
1967, was five years ten months and eleven days, and
hence before the six-year statute had run.
POINT 3: Plaintiff-respondent's claim for the prin·
cipal balance of $1065.00 due him for the land leveling
he did for the defendants, plus the interest thereon al
the legal rate of 6% per annum, from the due date to the
date of judgment, is a just claim, and the law does not
look with favor upon defeating a just cla~m if it can be
properly avoided.
It is apparent from the transcript of the evidence in
this case that the plaintiff-respondent has never been
paid the principal balance of $1065.00 which became due
to him for the land leveling he did for the defendants.
and he is justly entitled to be paid such balance togeth·
er with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
its due date to the date of judgment, plus his costs here·
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in expended, and if a defeat of such just claim can be
properly avoided this should be done. Also where there
is doubt as to whether a just claim is founded upon an
instrument in writing, or upon an open account, an oral
agreement, or is one created by statute, the one giving
the longest period of limitation should be preferred.
Plaintiff-respondent submits the following authorities
supporting these rules:
HARDINGE CO., Inc. v. EIMCO CORP., 266 P. 2d, 494; 1
Utah 2d 320.
4. Limitation of Actions Key 5 (3) Where substatiai
doubt exists as to which is applicable statute of limitations, the longer rather than the shorter period of limitation is to be preferred generally. U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-23,

25, 26(3).

JUAB COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
v. SUMMERS, 456 P. 2d, 1, 19 Utah 2d 49.

2. Limitation of Actions Key 5 (1) Generally, if there
is doubt as to whether transaction is one under written
contract or one created by state statute, one giving longest period of limitation is to be preferred. U.C.A. 1953,
78-12-23, 78-12-26 ( 4).
3. Action Key 12 The law does not look with favor
upon defeating of just obligation if it can be properly
avoided.

Note: The trial judge, Hon. J. Harlan Burns, doubtless
believed from the evidence submitted that the
plaintiff's claim was a just claim when he cited
this case in his Memorandum Decision about the
middle of page 3 thereof.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. SECURITY FIRST NAT.

BANK OF LOS ANGELES, 191 P. 2d, 78, 84 CA 575.
13. limitation of Actions Key 5 (1) Where facts relied
upon leave it clearly in doubt whether case is within
statute of limitations pleaded, court should not indulge
a strained construction in order to support the plea.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff-respondent's claim is founded upon an instrument or instruments in writing, and hence !t is con15

trolled by the six-year statute of limitation, whch had
not run when the plaintiff's Complaint was filed and
hence it is not barred by Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953.
Plaintiff's claim is not barred by Utah's four-year
statute of limitations as this statute is not applicable
Plaintiff's claim for the principal balance of $1065.00 plus
interest thereon at 6% per annum from its due d~te to
the date of judgment, plus plaintiff's costs, is a just
claim, and the Honorable District Judge who made and
caused to be entered herein judgment for said amounts
committed no error, and such judgment should be af.
firmed
Respectfully submitted
DURHAM MORRIS
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
172 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720
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